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1 This point has been further discussed in Unger’s paper on interdisciplinarity in CDS (2016) 











1.3		 Research	Questions		 Following	on	from	the	above,	my	thesis	aims	to	answer	the	following	research	questions:		 RQ1a:	How	do	MINUSTAH	leaders	discursively	construct	the	mission’s	identity	through	their	statements?		 RQ1b:	Do	MINUSTAH	decision-makers	discursively	construct	Latin	American	identity/ies	as	a	potential	resource	for	a	successful	mission	in	Haiti?	If	so,	how	and	why?	RQ1a	is	aimed	at	researching	the	different	means	of	discursive	identity	construction	used	by	MINUSTAH	through	interviews	with	relevant	leaders	and	decision-makers	in	the	mission.	RQ1b	starts	from	the	findings	of	the	dissertation	pilot	study	(published	in	(Ferreiro	&	Wodak,	2014),	which	established	a	strong	link	between	discourses	about	a	Latin	American	identity	within	the	mission,	and	the	consequences	that	it	could	have	for	a	potentially	successful	outcome	of	the	mission.	The	aim	of	this	RQ	is	to	investigate	this	feature	in	more	detail	and	to	explore	how	such	discursive	constructions	of	Latin	American	identity	are	characterized	and	which	role	they	might	play	in	the	imaginaries	about	the	mission.	The	idea	is	to	critically	examine	the	features	of	this	Latin	American	identity	present	in	MINUSTAH	leaders’	statements,	focusing	on	the	strategies	that	could	be	“covering”	an	underlying	power	struggle	in	geopolitical	terms	(i.e.:	Latin	America	vs	USA).	The	data	examined	for	my	dissertation	showed	a	recurring	
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2 This ‘timeline’ was elaborated with data from Lemay-Hébert (2015), Dubois (2012), Zanotti 
(2011) and Farmer (2006) 




important	role	in	Haitian	history:	it	is	still	widely	practised	in	Haiti,	being	the	major	cult	(normally	combined	with	other	religions	such	as	Christianity).			 Between	1793	and	1802	the	Haitian	revolution	was	led	by	Toussaint	L’Ouverture,	a	former	black	slave	who	led	an	uprising	that	overthrew	and	forced	out	the	French	rulers	who	had	run	Haiti	as	a	colony	since	1660	and	abolished	slavery	in	1794.	Ten	years	later,	in	1804,	after	Toussaint	L’Ouverture's	capture	and	imprisonment	in	France,	Jean	Jacques	Dessalines	defeated	the	French	troops	sent	to	regain	control,	and	proclaimed	Haiti's	independence	and	himself	as	emperor.	All	white	people	were	either	expelled	or	killed.	This	racial	founding	element	was	influential	both	on	Haitian	social	structure	–	where,	up	to	the	uprising,	the	white	minority	still	had	most	of	the	economic	power4	-	and	for	its	subsequent	international	isolation:	the	'western	world'	refused	to	recognise	Haiti	as	an	independent	republic,	mainly	because	their	slave-trade	business	was	being	threatened.		 In	1817,	an	important	event	in	Haiti’s	relations	with	Latin	America	took	place:	Pétion,	Ruler	of	the	South	(Haiti	was	divided	into	three	areas	by	then),	sent	military	and	financial	aid	to	Simón	Bolivar	to	support	his	quest	for	Latin	American	independence	from	Spain.	The	explicit	condition	requested	by	Petiòn	was	that	Bolivar	should	free	all	slaves	in	the	independence	process.	However,	this	alliance	between	Latin	America	and	Haiti	weakened	in	time	and	vanished	when	France	asked	Haiti	for	compensation	in	exchange	for	recognition	as	an	independent	nation,	as	no	Latin	American	countries	offered	any	resistance	or	support.			 During	the	period	of	Pierre	Boyer's	rule	(1818-43)	Haiti	was	unified,	but	he	excluded	blacks	from	all	participation	and	representation	in	power.	Boyer	himself	was	a	mulatto5.	Within	this	period,	in	1825	France	–	the	former	colonial	
                                            
4 For a more complete account of Haitian social structure and its historical background see 
(Bourjolly, 2010; Casimir, 2012; Castor, 2012; Grau, 2009) 
5 ‘Race’ politics have been very important in Haitian history. I will mention some of the main 
events throughout this chapter and also in Section 3.3. I am fully aware that the terms ‘race’, 
‘black’ and ‘mulatto’ are controversial and heavily loaded in the context of Haiti. For the sake 
of clarity, ‘black’ refers to people of apparently unmixed sub-Saharan African descent. 
 
21 
power	-		sent	12	armed	ships	demanding	a	150	million	gold	francs	indemnity	(equivalent	to	£14	billion	nowadays)	in	return	for	diplomatic	recognition,	which	only	came	in	1934.	By	1914,	80%	of	the	Haitian	budget	was	being	used	to	pay	France	and	French	banks	this	compensation.	Regretfully,	Latin	American	countries	as	well	as	the	President	of	the	USA,	then	Thomas	Jefferson,	went	along	with	France	and	refused	to	recognise	Haiti.	This	started	its	profound	isolation	from	the	rest	of	the	world	that	can	be	illustrated	with	the	following	fact:	only	in	2002	was	Haiti	finally	approved	as	a	full	member	of	the	Caribbean	Community	trade	bloc	(CARICOM).		 In	1915,	after	escalating	friction	between	blacks	and	mulattos,	the	USA	decided	to	invade	Haiti	in	order	to	protect	American	property	and	investments	such	as	coffee,	cocoa	and	sugar	cane	fields	and	textile	plants.	This	started	a	20-year	long	intervention	in	Haiti	by	the	Marines,	initiating	the	long	history	of	the	USA's	‘direct	political’	involvement	in	the	country.	In	1934,	the	USA	withdrew	troops	from	Haiti	but	kept	fiscal	control	until	1947.		 Between	1957	and	1986	the	violent	Duvalier	dictatorships	occurred.	First	came	Francois	Duvalier	(“Papa	Doc”)	a	physician	and	voodoo	priest	who	proclaimed	himself	'President	for	Life'	between	1957	and	his	death	in	19716.	Afterwards	he	was	succeeded	by	his	son	Jean-Claude	(“Baby	Doc”),	also	President	for	Life,	until	a	popular	uprising	overthrew	him	in	1986.		 In	1990	Jean	Bertrand	Aristide,	a	former	catholic	priest,	was	elected	in	Haiti's	first	free	and	peaceful	election.	However,	in	1991,	a	coup	led	by	Brigadier-General	Raoul	Cedras	ousted	Aristide.	This	triggered	sanctions	from	the	USA	and	the	Organization	of	American	States	(OAS).	In	1994,	the	military	regime	relinquished	power	in	the	face	of	an	imminent	US	invasion.	American	military	
                                            
‘Mulatto’ refers to evidently bi-racial people of mixed African and European descent. For a 
better understanding of this issues in Haiti see Quinn & Sutton, 2013. 
6 Graham Greene's famous novel 'The Comedians' (1966) is a very insightful account of the 







                                            












                                            
8 See (Échevin, 2011; Singh, 1987; ‘Staff and Quality Data Play Critical Role in Haiti Disaster 




2.3	 UN	Missions	and	International	Interventions				 But	being	a	poor	and	troubled	country	does	not	entail	necessarily	having	an	international	intervention	in	times	of	crisis	per	se.	There	is	a	history	and	an	institutional	apparatus	that	together	explain	why	these	missions	are	deployed.	In	order	to	understand	why	a	UN	mission	takes	place	in	Haiti,	it	is	also	necessary	to	contextualise	international	interventions	and	how	UN	missions	take	place	in	those	contexts.		 The	Concert	of	Europe	(composed	of	Austria,	Prussia,	Russian	Empire	and	the	United	Kingdom),	formed	after	the	defeat	of	Napoleon	with	the	purpose	of	maintaining	peace	in	Europe,	and	which	only	lasted	from	1815-1823,	was,	nevertheless,	for	almost	a	century	(1815-1914),	“the	most	comprehensive	attempt	to	construct	new	machinery	for	keeping	peace	among	and	by	the	great	powers”	(Thakur,	2006,	p.	28).	Therefore,	it	can	be	considered	the	precursor	of	international	peace-keeping	organisations.	Around	the	turn	of	the	twentieth	century,	The	Hague	Conferences	of	1899	and	1907	introduced	a	broadening	of	international	relations	in	participation	and	agenda.	They	aimed	to	establish	an	emergent	extra-European	international	system,	in	the	management	of	which	the	lesser	powers	could	demand	a	say;	and,	with	their	emphasis	upon	mediation,	conciliation	and	inquiry,	they	demonstrated	a	rationalistic	and	legalistic	approach	to	the	problem	of	international	disputes	(Thakur,	ibid.).			 The	two	major	international	organisations	of	the	twentieth	century	were	the	League	of	Nations	after	the	First	World	War	and	the	United	Nations	after	the	Second	World	War.	In	both	instances,	people	horrified	by	the	destructiveness	of	modern	wars	decided	to	create	institutions	to	avoid	a	repetition	of	such	catastrophes.		 The	League	was	built	around	Europe	as	the	core	of	the	international	political	system	(Claude,	1971,	p.	49).	It	accepted	the	sovereign	state	as	the	central	unit	of	international	affairs	and	the	Great	Powers	as	the	dominant	participants.	According	to	Claude	(ibid)	the	League	“began	as	the	embodiment	of	
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2.4	 Main	Structures	of	the	UN				 In	order	to	understand	how	the	apparatus	of	the	UN	is	organised	and	deployed	in	an	operation,	I	will	explain	briefly	its	main	actors.			 The	General	Assembly	(GA)	is	the	plenary	body	made	up	of	all	the	UN	member	states,	each	one	of	which	has	one	vote.	There	were	51	original	members	of	the	United	Nations.	By	2013	there	were	193	member	states,	the	latest	addition	being	South	Sudan	on	the	14th	July	2011.	This	steady	expansion	has	enabled	the	organisation	to	meet	its	goal	of	universal	membership	and	has	been	helped	by	the	fact	that	joining	the	UN	is	seen	as	conferring	the	final	imprimatur	of	sovereign	identity	(Thakur,	2006,	p.	30),	a	symbolism	that	was	very	important	in	the	recent	recognition	of	Palestine	as	a	non-member	state,	even	though	member-state	condition	has	not	been	obtained	yet.		 The	United	Nations	Security	Council	(UNSC)	has	fifteen	members,	of	which	five	are	permanent	and	non-elected,	known	colloquially	as	the	P5:	China,	France,	Russia,	the	United	States	and	the	United	Kingdom.	Of	the	ten	remaining	
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9 The Organization of American States (OAS) is the world’s oldest regional organization and it 
is composed of all 35 independent states of the Americas. According to Article 1 of the 
Charter, its purpose is to achieve among its member states "an order of peace and justice, to 
promote their solidarity, to strengthen their collaboration, and to defend their sovereignty, their 























                                            




                                            
between 50,000 to more than 300,000. Establishing the number is politically highly 
contentious as to do so defines the magnitude of the problem. Without engaging here in a 
discussion about the anthropology of numbers, I will say that there are no exact figures (as 
mentioned in Section 2.2 above) and I provide a reference to the source in each paragraph 



































ethos	among	the	Latin-American	nations.	For	him,	there	is	no	Latin-American	‘being’.	This	way,	the	question	about	a	‘Latin-American	being’	would	be	a	false	problem	because	there	are	only	historic	and	culturally	generated	ways	of	life	that	have	not	and	cannot	have	an	ontological	reality,	a	kind	of	immobile	legality.	Latin	America	–	according	to	this	view	–	has	no	common	source	of	cultural	creation	nor	does	it	display	the	same	cultural	features	in	its	countries.	There	is	neither	ethnic	nor	cultural	uniformity.		 Larraín	(2001,	p.	12)	agrees	with	Sambarino	that	it	is	inaccurate	to	look	for	an	ontologically	constituted	Latin-	American	'essence'	but,	he	argues,	there	is	a	relatively	common	way	of	life	that	is	historically	variable,	therefore	it	is	possible	to	talk	about	a	Latin-	American	identity	as	a	historically	changing	“cultural	identity”.		 Even	though	at	first	glance	it	may	look	as	though	Larraín	is	opposed	to	Mignolo,	it	is	worth	taking	into	account	that	Mignolo	is	contesting	the	cultural	origin	of	the	concept	of	‘Latin	America’,	which	is	not	contradictory	to	developing	a	way	of	life,	especially	one	that	has	to	do	with	the	colonial	powers	and	their	tensions/interactions	with	the	creoles11	in	Latin	America.	Moreover,	Mignolo	suggests	that	the	way	of	life	referred	to	by	Larraín	may	be	the	way	of	a	creole	elite,	rather	than	an	indigenous	one		 The	history	of	“Latin”	America	after	independence	is	the	variegated	history	of	the	local	elite,	willingly	or	not,	embracing	“modernity”	while	
                                            
11 “Creole(s)” is used in this chapter in the sense of ‘local’ rather than its linguistic sense of a 



















its	own	identity	while	denying	others	a	claim	to	self-assertion.”	(2003,	p.	14).	It	is	again	an	uneven	power	relationship	of	domination,	which	seems	to	fit	with	a	de-(post)colonialism	framework.	In	Feres'	words:		 [c]ounter-conceptual	pairs	share	a	common	semantic	structure:	the	other	is	construed	in	opposition	to	the	group's	self-image,	usually	through	derogatory	expressions	and	stereotypes	that	denote	perversion,	incompleteness,	retardation,	and	lack	of	the	group's	self-bestowed	qualities.	(Feres	Jr,	2003,	p.	14)		 At	this	point,	it	is	worth	taking	a	look	at	some	of	the	most	important	counter-conceptual	pairs	used	in	the	definition	of	Latin	America's	identity.	Regarding	the	opposition	nature/humanity	mentioned	before,	Mignolo	makes	a	point	about	how	“Latin”	America	has	been	conceived	on	both	sides	of	that	opposition:		 Thus,	Creole	intellectuals	in	the	nineteenth	century,	like	Domingo	Faustino	Sarmiento	in	Argentina	and	Euclides	Da	Cunha	in	Brazil,	used	the	“nature”	versus	“civilization”	paradigm	to	define	the	Creole	elite	against	the	“barbarian”	indigenous	inhabitants	of	South	America.	[...]	the	Creole	elites	were	simultaneously	self-colonizing	by	taking	on	a	French	idea	of	themselves	as	“Latin”,	which	opposed	them	to	the	Anglo,	who	represented	civilization,	and	located	them	more	on	the	side	of	“nature”.	(2005,	p.xvi)		 This	ambivalence	is	consistent	with	the	dimension	of	postcolonialism	explained	before	in	which	Latin-American	creoles	become	the	new	colonisers	and	maintain	the	same	logic	of	coloniality	against	the	indigenous	people.	Hence,	they	are	on	“both	sides”	of	that	opposition	as	well.	Additionally,	this	appropriation	of	“Latin”	by	the	Creole	elite	opposing	them	to	the	Anglo,	might	be	interpreted	as	an	instance	of	‘fractal	recursivity’	(Irvine	&	Gal,	2000,	p.	38).	They	define	‘fractal	recursivity’	as		
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12 For a critical view on the “empty-shell” approach taken in Timor-Leste (and Kosovo), see 





























3.8	 Critical	Discourse	Studies:	Main	Concepts13		 Since	its	start	in	the	late	1980s,	Critical	Discourse	Analysis	(CDA)	(from	now	on	Critical	Discourse	Studies	[CDS])	has	become	a	well-established	field	in	the	social	sciences.	CDS	cannot	be	regarded	as	a	discrete	academic	discipline	in	any	traditional	sense,	with	a	fixed	set	of	theories,	categories,	assumptions	or	research	methods.	Instead,	CDS	can	be	seen	as	a	problem-oriented	interdisciplinary	research	programme,	subsuming	a	variety	of	approaches,	each	drawing	on	different	epistemological	assumptions,	with	different	theoretical	models,	research	methods	and	agenda.	What	unites	them	is	a	shared	interest	in	the	semiotic	dimensions	of	power,	injustice	and	political-economic,	social	or	cultural	change	in	our	globalised	and	globalising	world	and	societies.	The	roots	of	CDS	lie	in	rhetoric,	text	linguistics,	anthropology,	philosophy,	sociology,	psychology,	cognitive	science,	literary	studies	and	sociolinguistics,	as	well	as	in	applied	linguistics	and	pragmatics.			 In	general,	CDS	is	characterised	by	a	number	of	principles:	for	example,	all	approaches	are	problem	oriented,	and	thus	necessarily	interdisciplinary	and	eclectic.	Moreover,	CDS	is	characterised	by	a	common	interest	in	demystifying	ideologies	and	power	through	the	systematic	and	retroductable14	investigation	of	semiotic	data	(written,	spoken	or	visual).	CDS	researchers	also	attempt	to	make	their	own	positions	and	interests	explicit	while	retaining	their	respective	
                                            
13 This section is based mostly on the first two sections of (Ferreiro & Wodak, 2014) 
14 ‘Retroductable’, a translation of the German term nachvollziehbar, means that in the 
Humanities and Social Sciences (and in qualitative research in general), we cannot test 
hypotheses or prove them like in the quantitative paradigm. In contrast, though, qualitative 
analyses must be transparent, selections and interpretations justified, and value positions 
made explicit. In this way, the procedures and meanings of qualitative analyses remain 














                                            

























3.9	 Summary			 In	this	chapter	I	have	attempted	to	summarise	the	main	discussions	around	the	core	concepts	involved	in	this	research,	as	well	as	provide	an	overview	of	the	main	theoretical	frameworks	of	CDS	and	its	main	concepts.	I	have	also	summarised	the	main	features	of	the	DHA,	in	which	this	thesis	is	positioned.		 To	sum	up,	I	am	working	under	the	assumptions	that	‘Latin	America’	is	a	problematic	identity	and	that	it	is	perhaps	easier	to	establish	as	a	counter-
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16 However, this Latin-American ‘trait’ of the MINUSTAH can be found in the literature about it 
(see for example (Malacalza, 2016a, 2016b; Heine & Thompson, 2011; Ross, 2004) 





4.2 Analysing	the	Interviews	In	the	previous	section	I	explained	how	the	documentary	project	shaped	some	elements	of	the	PhD	thesis.	In	this	section	I	will	explain	how	the	data	selection	is	related	to	the	scope	of	the	thesis	and	its	research	questions.		 4.2.1 Interviews	as	a	research	method			 Since	my	research	interest	lies	in	the	processes	of	the	discursive	
                                            
18 There are exceptions, of course, which are labelled under the “non-narrative 
documentaries” sub-genre. Notable directors such as Ron Fricke and Godfrey Reggio are 

















                                            







• In	your	opinion,	how	have	the	Haitian	people	perceived	the	actions	of	MINUSTAH	after	the	sexual	abuse	accusations?		 7.	 It	seems	that	'Security'	and	'Stability'	are	the	core	concepts	in	the	UNSC	resolutions	about	MINUSTAH.	In	your	opinion,	how	do	these	concepts	relate	to	each	other/differentiate/overlap?			8.	 Which	are	your	worst	and	best	experiences	working	in	MINUSTAH?	 			 		 Rather	than	being	a	closed	questionnaire,	the	sub-questions	in	2-6	were	actually	topical	probes	(Hennik	et	al.,	2011	p.	120)	which	were	meant	as	guidelines	to	start	talking	about	a	topic	and	not	to	elicit	a	straightforward	short	answer.		 Following	the	categories	offered	by	Hennik	et	al.	(2011,	p.	112),	Question	1	would	be	an	opening	question;	Questions	2-6,	the	key	questions;	and	Questions	7	&	8,	the	closing	questions.		 There	were	some	interviews	in	which	time	constraints	forced	me	to	drop	some	of	the	opening	or	closing	questions	to	focus	directly	on	Questions	2,	3,	4,	5	&	6	which	have	a	more	straightforward	connection	with	my	research	questions.		 More	than	once,	the	flow	of	the	interview	would	make	the	interviewee	answer	some	of	the	latter	questions,	making	it	unnecessary	to	ask	them	afterwards.		 Additionally,	five	out	of	the	eighteen	interviews	were	conducted	in	the	
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20 For an account of the “three external shocks” that Haiti suffered around 2008 (Food and 
fuel crisis, Natural disasters (storms and hurricanes), and Global financial turmoil) see 




                                            
21 Of course, it could be argued that there is some agency in terms of preventing the damage 
caused by the earthquake, from insisting on anti-seismic buildings to training the population in 
how to react in the event of an earthquake. However, the last earthquake with a magnitude as 
destructive as the one in 2010 was as long ago as 1842 in Cap-Haïtien with 5,300 recorded 
fatalities. More recent, albeit less intense earthquakes took place in 1994 and 1953 with 4 and 
2 casualties respectively (see ten Brink et al., 2011 for more details). Since the last 
destructive earthquake was almost 170 years before the 2010 earthquake, it is hard to blame 
the authorities of the poorest country of the hemisphere for not taking more precautions. 
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22 There were some cases, such as extracts 5.4 and 7.2, which involve more than one macro-
topic. In those cases, they were presented in the chapter according to which macro-topic is 
the most salient in the extract, but the interaction between macro-topics was analysed as well. 



















	15th	October	2004	 SRSG	(2004-2006)	I	 51'	 8,257	 Santiago,	Chile		26th	December	2013	 SRSG	(2004-2006)	II	 82'	 13,511	 Santiago,	Chile		19th	May	2015	 SRSG	(2006-2007	&	2010-2011)		Assistant	Secretary-General	for	Peacekeeping	Operations	(2007-2010	&	2011-2015)	
89'	 12,084	 UN	Headquarters,	New	York,	United	States	
	15th	May	2015	 SRSG	(2013-present)	 32'	 3,785	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti		February	2005	 Force	Commander	(2004-2005)	 33'	 3,781	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti		13th	May	2015	 Force	Commander	(2014-2015)†	 47'	 5,667	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti		8th	May	2015	 Police	Commissioner	(2014-	present)	(He	was	also	Deputy	Commissioner	for	the	Development	of	the	Haitian	National	Police	between	November	2012	
80'	 10,941	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti	
                                            
23 These numbers are based on the word count in MS Word, which counts strings of letters 
between spaces or certain punctuation.  





	15th	May	2015	 Civilian	Officer	(2013-2015)	 59'	 8,997	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti		January	2005	 Special	advisor	to	the	SRSG	(2004-2006)†	 61'	 6,932	 Pétionville,	Haiti		23rd	December	2013	 Special	advisor	to	the	SRSG	(2011-2013)	(He	had	been	working	in/about	Haiti	in	diplomatic	positions	since	2000)	
120'	 19,420	 Santiago,	Chile	




	13th	May	2015	 Force	Commander	 23'	 3,608	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti	
                                            





	12th	May	2015	 Rule	of	Law	Coordinator	(2013-2015)	 44'	 6,022	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti		14th	May	2015	 Chief	Joint	Mission	Analysis	Centre	(2011-2015)	
19'	 1,869	 Port-au-Prince,	Haiti	






















































































in	the	discursive	construction	of	MINUSTAH	between	2004	and	2015?).	Of	course,	not	all	the	topics	allow	for	comparison	(as	the	‘three	shocks’	all	happened	at	least	5	years	after	my	first	fieldtrip),	but	whenever	comparison	was	possible,	it	is	discussed.	Latin-American	identity	is	a	topic	covered	in	all	fieldtrips.	And	even	though	‘security	and	stability’	were	not	among	the	questions	asked	in	2005,	when	those	topics	emerged	they	were	also	considered	for	comparison.		 4.2.6 Ethics			 	 As	mentioned	before,	there	are	two	different	sets	of	interviews	used	in	this	thesis.	The	first	one	belongs	to	the	documentary	project	and	were	conducted	at	least	7	years	before	starting	this	PhD	project.	Therefore,	no	departmental	consent	forms	exist	for	these	interviews.	However,	I	did	use	some	of	the	documentary	interviews	for	my	MA	in	Discourse	Studies	dissertation	at	Lancaster	University	(see	Ferreiro	&	Wodak,	2014,	for	a	published	version	of	the	samples	used).	At	that	time,	I	discussed	the	ethical	issues	with	the	departmental	
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24 One of them did not agree to talk about this on the record. The other one said that she did 





• Outlining	the	‘route	map’:	Before	each	interview,	when	I	was	in	the	process	of	introducing	myself,	explaining	the	project	and	giving	my	interviewees	the	consent	forms,	I	would	also	point	briefly	to	the	main	points	that	I	was	intending	to	cover	during	the	interview.	This	was	not	only	for	transparency	purposes,	but	also	helped	to	engage	my	interviewees	with	my	research	interests.	In	other	words,	they	would	know	that	the	interview	would	be	finished	only	once	we	had	covered	all	the	issues	I	mentioned	at	the	beginning.	This	applies	to	the	interviews	done	post-2006,	already	in	the	‘research	context’.		 	4.2.8 Transcription	and	Translation		Even	though	I	am	aware	that	the	transcription	process	has	its	complexities	and	theoretical	issues	(Ochs,	1979),	along	with	issues	of	validity	and	reliability	(Peräkylä,	1997),	I	will	explain	the	decisions	I	made	on	these	issues.		 The	focus	of	the	interview	analyses	is	more	on	discursive	strategies	such	as	social	actor	representation,	argumentation,	nomination	and	predication	(see	section	4.2.5	above),	rather	than	features	relevant	to	Conversation	Analysis	(CA)	(for	an	overview	and	discussion	on	CA	see	Silverman,	1998;	ten	Have,	1999)	or	Phonetics	(Hutchby	&	Wooffitt,	1998;	Peräkylä,	2004).	For	this	reason,	I	follow	the	style	of	transcription	exemplified	by	Culpeper	(2011,	p.	223),	and	to	convey	something	of	the	prosody,	I	indicate	clear	pauses	with	full	stops,	indicate	in	parentheses	the	duration	of	pauses	longer	than	one	second,	and	put	exceptionally	
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heavily	stressed	words	in	bold.	“Uhms”,	“ahms”,	stuttering	and	audible	hesitations	are	all	transcribed	too,	and	overlapping	between	interviewer	and	interviewee	indicated	with	brackets.	In	this	sense,	the	set	of	transcription	conventions	used	is	a	slight	modification	of	the	“Simplified	Transcription	Symbols”	presented	by	Silverman	(2006,	pp.	398–399).	See	Table	4.3	below	for	a	summary.	Table	4.1:	Transcription	conventions	used	.	 Small	pause	(≤1s)		(number	of	seconds)	 Long	pause	(>1s)	[				]	 Overlap	=	 Latching	(xxx)	 Unintelligible	words	<	simultaneous/>	 Simultaneous	speech	[…]	 Denotes	text	not	transcribed	in	the	extract		 More	than	half	of	the	interviews	were	conducted	in	Spanish	(the	rest	in	English),	which	obviously	must	be	taken	into	consideration	in	a	linguistics	thesis	written	in	English.	However,	grammatical	features	do	not	play	a	preeminent	role	in	the	analysis	of	the	interviews.	As	a	matter	of	fact,	and	following	the	eclectic	features	of	CDS	explained	in	Section	3.8.1	above,	when	mentioning	grammatical	features,	I	do	not	adhere	to	an	exclusive	grammar	theory	framework.	The	focus,	then	is	on	discursive	strategies,	which	work	similarly	in	both	English	Spanish.	Thus,	following	the	work	done	by	Wodak	et	al.	(2009)	on	national	identity	in	Austria,	I	analyse	the	Spanish	interviews	in	Spanish	and	present	the	analysis	results	in	English	in	the	thesis.	I	always	present	the	original	transcription	next	to	the	English	translation	of	it	for	more	transparency.	If	there	is	only	an	English	version	of	the	extract	that	means	that	the	interview	was	conducted	in	English.	When	necessary,	I	provide	footnotes	clarifying	any	'lost	in	translation'	issues,	local	idioms,	polysemic	words,	and	specific	metaphors	or	expressions.				
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25 Gruenberg (2009) provides a comprehensive account of the different words used in UNSC 
resolutions dividing them into three categories: Emotive, Instructive, and Modifiers. However, 
he does not offer categories for the different sections of the resolutions. 




                                            
this analysis. 
27 Resolution 1908 was released a week after the earthquake. As can be inferred from the 
amount of words (236) it is very short and it is basically an expression of sorrow, gratitude and 
the announcement of the rapid enlargement of the mission. Moreover, this resolution does not 
contain either the word 'stability' or 'security'. Additionally, the structure and content of its 
paragraphs do not display any continuity with either previous or forthcoming resolutions. 










of	words		20th	April	2004	 	 1542	 1,609		13th	October	2009	 	 1892	 2,628	Earthquake	[12	January	2010]		 	 		19th	January	2010	 1908	 236			4th	June	2010	 	 1927	 997	
	14th	October	2010	











                                            
28 To avoid being redundant, I will not explain again those strategies here, but rather refer the 




















5.1	 Field	notes			5.1.1	 SRSG	Interview	in	2004		 	This	was	actually	my	first	interview	in	the	documentary.	It	worked	as	a	way	to	familiarise	myself	with	MINUSTAH	and	Haiti’s	situation.	This	interview	was	held	on	the	15th	October	2004	in	Santiago,	Chile,	at	the	interviewee’s	house.	Extracts	5.1,	5.6,	5.7,	5.8	and	5.10	are	from	this	interview.	The	interview	was	mostly	conducted	by	me,	with	the	exception	of	the	question	in	Extract	5.10,	which	was	asked	by	the	director	of	the	documentary.	As	I	mentioned	in	Section	XX	in	the	Introduction,	the	director	of	the	documentary	–	a	very	good	friend	of	mine	-	happens	to	be	the	son	of	the	interviewee.	I	believe	that	this	did	not	interfere	much	in	the	interview	as	their	interaction	was	very	limited,	but	of	course	it	was	a	source	of	tension	that	I	was	very	aware	of.	
 
119 
	 The	setting	of	the	interview	being	the	interviewee’s	living	room,	it	is	fair	to	say	that	he	was	reasonably	comfortable	and	relaxed,	which	allowed	him	to	produce	long	answers	that	sounded	sincere	to	me	at	the	time.		 In	2004	I	was	just	becoming	involved	in	the	documentary	project	and	I	did	not	have	in	mind	doing	any	further	research	(such	as	a	PhD)	at	the	time	of	the	interview.	My	position	as	interviewer	was	more	about	trying	to	understand	and	learn	as	much	as	possible	rather	than	challenging	my	interviewee	in	an	aggressive	fashion.	I	am	not	saying	that	I	carried	out	any	of	the	rest	of	the	interviews	in	a	challenging/aggressive	manner,	but	I	believe	that	it	is	worth	making	clear	what	my	disposition	was.	This	meant	that	the	tone	of	the	interview	was	more	similar	to	a	teacher-student	dynamic	than	a	political	interview.	Besides,	he	was	my	friend’s	father,	which	also	explains	the	asymmetrical-but-close	dynamic.		5.1.2	 Force	Commander	Interview	in	2005		 	The	interview	where	Extracts	5.2	and	5.3	come	from	was	held	in	February	2005	in	the	neighbourhood	of	Bel	Air	in	Port-au-Prince	during	a	military/humanitarian	operation	of	cleaning	rubbish	from	the	streets	which	was	at	least	3	metres	tall	and	as	wide	as	the	road.	This	interview	was	arranged	by	MINUSTAH’s	press	department	and	it	meant	spending	all	the	morning	until	lunch	with	the	then-Force	Commander,	General	Heleno.			 Bel	Air	was,	at	the	time,	one	of	the	two	most	dangerous	places	in	Haiti	(the	other	one	being	Cité	du	Soleil)	and	that	meant	that	we	had	to	wear	helmets	and	bulletproof	vests.	In	the	background,	a	loader	was	removing	the	mountain	of	rubbish	and	putting	it	into	tipper	lorries.	A	couple	of	locals	were	helping	with	spades,	help	which	was	more	symbolic	than	effective	when	compared	to	what	the	loader	could	remove,	but	for	the	military	it	was	key	to	have	the	people	involved.	That	meant	gaining	support	from	the	local	population	and	a	higher	chance	of	getting	intelligence	for	further	military	operations.		Everyone	working	there	was	using	a	mask	as	a	sanitary	measure	and	even	though	it	was	February,	it	was	very	hot.	I,	being	outside	in	a	short-sleeved	shirt,	could	hardly	imagine	how	the	soldier	operating	the	loader	could	cope,	wearing	
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30 Just to take the example mentioned by the interviewee himself, Chile’s dictatorship ended 
when the democratically elected Patricio Aylwin took office on 11th March 1990, 24 years 






























































mucho	tiempo	deseando	tener	un	asiento	permanente	en	el	Consejo	de	Seguridad	de	Naciones	Unidas.	Su	presencia	en	fuerzas	de	paz	constituye,	como	se	sabe,	un	antecedente	importante	para	que	un	país	tenga,	esté	presente	en	el	Consejo	de	Seguridad,	en	el	sentido	de	que	le	preocupan	los	temas	globales,	en	ese	sentido,	que	es	un	país	que	tiene	algo	que	decir	en	temas	globales.	Por	lo	tanto,	yo	diría	que	la,	la	idea	de	esta	misión	latinoamericana	viene	de	...	la	confluencia	de	los	latinoamericanos	en	...	Haití.		SRSG.	2004-2006	(in	2013)			 The	interviewee	admits	that	what	he	calls	“the	Latin-American	theory	of	Haiti”	was	constructed	after	the	deployment	of	the	mission,	rather	than	it	being	a	‘self-conscious’	Latin-American	regional	intervention	from	the	beginning.	After	stating	that	“ex-post”	condition,	he	continues	to	mitigate	possible	interpretations	that	this	could	imply	that	Latin	America	is	not	concerned	about	Haiti,	by	precisely	denying	it	explicitly.	Thus,	the	argument	implies	that	the	main	reasons	for	intervening	had	to	do	with	a	request	by	the	USA,	the	UNSG	and	with	geopolitical	interests.		 There	is	a	caveat	after	the	first	“because”	that	needs	to	be	closely	examined:	the	interviewee	does	not	want	us	to	think	that	Latin-American	countries	went	to	Haiti	“only”	because	the	USA	asked	for	it	but	because	the	UNSG	asked	for	it	“too”.	It	implies	an	attempt	to	diminish	the	influence	of	the	USA	over	Latin-American	foreign	policy	decisions.	In	this	sense,	mentioning	that	the	UNSG	also	requested	the	participation	of	some	Latin-American	countries	in	this	intervention	achieves	a	more	international	scope.		 A	somewhat	utilitarian	reasoning	lies	behind	the	argument	that	Brazil’s	interest	in	becoming	a	permanent	member	of	the	UNSC	is	driving	its	participation	in	the	mission	in	Haiti.	In	other	words,	the	mission	in	Haiti	is	just	
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another	means	to	that	end.	In	that	sense,	the	mission	in	Haiti	becomes	‘interchangeable’:	it	could	be	in	any	country	around	the	world,	as	long	as	it	boosts	Brazil’s	CV	in	participating	in	global	issues.	The	presupposition	here,	after	“as	it	is	widely	known”,	has	to	do	precisely	with	being	acquainted	with	the	UNSC	procedures	and	requirements	to	become	a	permanent	member31.	In	other	words,	he	presupposes	that	we	know	that	participating	in	UN	peacekeeping	operations	is	necessary	to	be	a	permanent	member	of	the	UNSC.		 In	terms	of	predicational	strategies,	Haiti	is	presented	as	“little,	historic	and	heroic”,	which	sounds	patronising32.	This	belittlement	of	Haiti	stands	in	the	immediate	context	in	which	powerful	actors	such	as	the	USA,	the	UNSG	and	Brazil	are	staged,	thus	reducing	the	matter	of	the	mission	in	Haiti	to	the	interests	of	those	three.				 		 	
                                            
31 Although no new permanent members have been admitted in the UNSC since the People’s 
Republic of China in 1971 









                                            




                                            
34 “Baba” was a Haitian woman in charge of personnel training for those who arrived in Haiti 
for MINUSTAH. She was in charge of teaching them about the most relevant issues about 
Haitian culture to help with the basics of settling in and dealing with day-to-day matters. She 
was interviewed for the documentary project where she expressed a very critical point of view 











































                                            







                                            
36 As a matter of fact, in his address at the 52nd DPI/NGO Conference in New York on 15th  
September 1999, the then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan talked precisely about the 
meaning of “international community”: What binds us into an international community? In the 
broadest sense there is a shared vision of a better world for all people, as set out, for example 
in the United Nations Charter. [...] There is equally our sense of shared opportunity, which is 
why we build common markets and, yes, institutions – such as the United Nations. Together, 
we are stronger. Even though he never says explicitly that the international community is 











                                            




























                                            









                                            
39 Because of the reasons explained in the previous paragraph, I will regard resolution 1927 















                                            
40 The problem of displaced persons in Haiti remains an issue more than 7 years after the 
earthquake, with the camp of Canaan being the most infamous example. An overpopulated 
camp outside Port-au-Prince in a rather hostile and dry area, about which there is still no clear 







                                            
41 The UN country team comprises all the UN agencies (like FAO, UNESCO, UNICEF, UNDP, 
etc.) which are deployed in a country where a UN mission takes place. They are coordinated 











































                                            
42 Although these are not in the examples presented here. 
 
177 
	 In	this	section	I	present	the	analysis	of	the	interviews	with	MINUSTAH	leaders	regarding	the	concepts	of	Security	and	Stability.	I	start	by	providing	a	summary	of	my	field	notes	for	each	interview	and	then	I	move	on	to	analyse	some	extracts	of	the	interviews.	As	with	chapters	5	and	6,	I	have	grouped	the	extracts	into	the	main	macro-topics	that	emerged	during	the	analysis,	each	working	as	a	subsection.		 Finally,	I	present	a	summary	and	discussion	of	the	analysis,	making	the	relevant	connections	and	identifying	counterpoints	to	what	was	found	in	the	resolutions	analysis.		6.2.1	Field	notes			 In	this	section	I	present	data	from	five	interviews	each	with	a	different	interviewee.	All	this	data	was	collected	in	my	last	field-trip	in	2015,	four	of	them	in	the	MINUSTAH	Headquarters	in	Port-au-Prince,	Haiti	and	one	in	the	UN	Headquarters	in	New	York	City.	I	will	present	a	summary	of	my	field	notes	respecting	the	order	in	which	the	interviews	were	conducted.		6.2.1.1	Deputy	SRSG	Rule	of	Law	(2013-2016)	Interview	on	12th	May	2015		 		 I	remember	that	I	arrived	slightly	late	to	this	interview.	Mostly	because	it	was	my	first	time	in	the	MINUSTAH	headquarters	(called	“Log	Base”)	and	it	took	a	lot	of	time	to	get	the	security	clearance	to	be	allowed	in.	Additionally,	the	maps	of	the	site	were	not	very	good	and	it	took	me	some	time	to	find	my	way	to	the	Deputy	SRSG	Rule	of	Law	office.	The	office,	as	almost	the	whole	MINUSTAH	headquarters	complex,	was	a	portable	module	which	resembled	a	container,	although	it	was	furnished	and	air-conditioned.	I	apologised	and	explained	my	late	arrival	and	he	was	very	polite	and	nice.	I	explained	briefly	the	subjects	I	wanted	to	cover	during	the	interview	and	started	asking	about	himself:	his	role	and	the	main	challenges	in	MINUSTAH.	I	knew	that	he	had	a	background	working	in	the	Department	of	Justice	in	the	USA	and	that	his	role	in	MINUSTAH	was	linked	with	assisting	the	rule	of	law	structures	in	Haiti	in	order	to	get	them	operating	at	acceptable	levels.	
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	 Time	was	against	me	and	he	had	a	slow	pace	for	talking,	which	made	me	a	bit	anxious	about	not	being	able	to	cover	all	the	subjects.	Apparently,	I	managed	not	to	show	my	anxiety	(or	if	I	did,	it	did	not	affect	him)	because	the	interview	went	smoothly	and	we	were	able	to	cover	all	the	issues.		 As	an	interviewee,	he	was	very	aligned	with	the	official	discourse	and	he	had	no	critical	comments	to	make	towards	MINUSTAH	or	the	UN,	which	I	cannot	say	that	it	surprised	me.			6.2.1.2	Force	Commander	(2014-2015)43	Interview	on	13th	May	2015			 My	previous	interview	with	a	Force	Commander,	General	Heleno,	in	2005	(see	Section	5.1.2)	was	a	‘game	changer’	in	the	sense	of	how	he	changed	my	view	of	the	military.	I	would	not	say	that	I	was	expecting	the	same	character	as	General	Heleno	was.	Mainly	because	I	was	aware	that	General	Heleno	ended	up	being	too	critical	of	MINUSTAH	and	I	would	not	expect	MINUSTAH	repeating	itself	in	this	sense.	Still,	I	felt	very	positive	about	this	interview	in	advance,	probably	partly	because	of	that	previous	good	experience	and	probably	I	share	the	widely	held	positive	stereotype	about	Brazilians	in	which	they	are	generally	perceived	as	nice,	relaxed	and	happy	people.		 He	was	a	very	nice	interviewee	indeed,	with	a	very	good	sense	of	humour	and	he	did	not	commandeer	reverential	respect,	but	rather	some	closeness	which	made	for	a	relaxed	atmosphere	during	the	interview.		 He	was	nowhere	near	as	critical	as	Heleno	had	been	and	he	tried	to	be	very	careful	in	not	expressing	his	opinions	about	certain	sensitive	issues	which	might	involve	criticism	of	the	UN	or	the	civilian	leadership	of	MINUSTAH.			 		 This	interview	was	held	in	“Delta	Camp”,	which	was	a	few	miles	away	from	the	MINUSTAH	headquarters	in	“Log	Base”.	“Delta	Camp”	was	mostly	the	military	and	police	headquarters,	whereas	the	civilian	administrators	were	mostly	in	the	MINUSTAH	headquarters.	
                                            
43 Unfortunately, he died in a helicopter accident a few months after this interview. 
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	 His	office	also	consisted	of	portable	modules,	although	this	one	was	very	big	in	comparison	with	other	offices	I	visited.	We	were	never	alone	throughout	the	interview	and	other	Brazilian	Army	officers	were	nearby	in	the	room.	I	cannot	rule	out	that	this	fact	might	have	prevented	him	from	speaking	freely	or	being	more	critical	than	if	we	had	been	alone,	but	it	is	impossible	to	be	sure	about	it.		 	6.2.1.3	SRSG	(2013-2017)	Interview	on	15th	May	2015			 When	I	arrived	in	Haiti,	this	interview	was	still	not	on	my	schedule	and	it	was	only	confirmed	two	days	before	it	was	conducted.	Apparently,	her	tight	schedule	did	not	allow	for	too	much	anticipation	of	my	interview	and	I	was	confirmed	for	the	first	available	half	an	hour	in	between	meetings	that	she	could	give	me.		 I	felt	the	pressure	of	trying	to	cover	all	the	issues	in	a	short	interview	time,	in	addition	to	her	very	slow	way	of	talking,	all	of	which	made	me	feel	very	anxious.	Despite	this,	we	managed	to	talk	about	all	the	core	issues.		 The	interview	took	place	at	her	office	in	“Log	Base”,	also	made	of	portable	modules	and	a	bit	smaller	than	the	Force	Commander’s.	We	sat	at	a	small	round	table	and	her	assistant	was	there	with	us	almost	all	the	interview.	That	might	not	have	been	an	issue,	but	the	assistant’s	phone	rang	a	couple	of	times,	which	accounted	as	small	interruptions,	and	the	assistant	had	a	role	as	‘timekeeper’	which	put	a	lot	of	pressure	on	the	last	questions	as	she	was	reminding	the	SRSG	that	she	had	other	commitments.			 For	all	these	reasons,	I	perceived	the	atmosphere	of	this	interview	as	very	formal	and	not	relaxed.	Building	rapport	was	very	difficult	and	I	always	felt	that	she	was	adhering	strictly	to	the	official	UN	discourse.	There	was	no	room	for	her	to	express	criticism,	but	that	did	not	surprise	me	either.		6.2.1.4	Civilian	Officer	(2013-2015)	Interview	on	15th	May	2015		
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	 This	was	arguably	one	of	the	best	interviewees	that	I	had	in	this	field	trip.	She	asked	for	full	anonymity,	as	she	argued	that	what	she	could	tell	me	under	that	condition	would	be	more	useful	for	my	thesis	than	the	things	she	would	be	able	to	tell	me	if	she	could	be	identified.	That	meant	that	she	spoke	freely	and	made	several	critical	remarks	towards	MINUSTAH	and	the	UN	throughout	the	interview.	Additionally,	we	shared	some	similar	academic	backgrounds,	which	I	believe	helped	to	build	rapport,	when	I	remarked	that	I	had	an	academic	interest	and	I	was	not	a	journalist	(a	seemingly	unnecessary	clarification	which	I	made	in	my	spoken	introduction	to	almost	all	the	interviews	in	this	field	trip).		 The	fact	that	she	made	her	critical	views	explicit	gave	the	data	I	collected	in	that	trip	more	diversity	which	made	me	very	excited	at	the	time.	I	was	coming	from	interviewees	closer	to	the	‘official’	discourse,	so	this	was	a	very	refreshing	interview.		 The	atmosphere	was	very	friendly,	relaxed	and	open,	although	there	was	a	note	of	pessimism	around	it.	I	think	that	had	to	do	with	her	critical	observation	of	the	way	of	doing	things	in	the	‘peacekeeping	area’	which	entailed	a	certain	impotence	in	her,	and	even	more	regarding	Haiti	and	its	complexities	which	do	not	allow	for	easy,	clear-cut	or	quick	solutions.		 As	I	identified	with	her	point	of	view,	it	was	easy	to	feel	empathy	for	her	and	the	positions	she	took.		 This	interview	was	held	in	her	office	in	the	MINUSTAH	headquarters	in	“Log	Base”,	an	office	similar	in	size	to	the	SRSG’s,		though	maybe	a	bit	smaller,	and	with	a	view	over	the	nearby	airstrip.		6.2.1.5	SRSG	(2006-2008/2010-2011),	then	UN	Assistant	Secretary-General	for	Peacekeeping	Operations	Interview	on	19th	May	2015			 This	was	the	last	interview	of	the	trip	and	there	was	a	‘stroke	of	luck’	element	to	it.	In	one	of	my	last	interviews	on	the	day	before	I	left	Haiti,	my	interviewee	(Spokesperson	and	Deputy	Chief	of	Communications)	offered	to	put	me	into	contact	with	this	former	SRSG,	then	one	of	the	most	important	figures	in	the	UN	structure.	This	interview	was	confirmed	literally	only	12	hours	before	it	
 
181 
was	conducted,	upon	my	arrival	at	New	York,	while	collecting	my	bags	at	the	airport.		 When	I	arrived	at	the	place	where	I	was	staying	in	Manhattan,	I	decided	to	update	my	knowledge	about	this	interviewee.	Even	though	this	was	the	natural	thing	to	do,	I	had	always	asked	myself	whether	it	was	a	good	idea	or	not.	The	reason	is	that	he	was	a	controversial	figure	in	his	home	country	as	he	was	involved	in	adoption	schemes	while	there	was	a	guerrilla	uprising.	These	irregular	adoptions	by	Canadians	and	Americans	had	been	labelled	as	“child	trafficking”	and	that	was	definitely	not	a	concept	which	I	was	comfortable	with	seeing	a	future	interviewee	associated	with.	I	spent	time	during	the	night	trying	to	put	those	thoughts	behind	me.	And	the	same	the	morning	after	on	my	way	to	his	office.	I	knew	that	this	had	nothing	to	do	with	my	research	and	that	despite	my	eagerness	to	know	his	side	of	the	story,	it	would	be	detrimental	to	my	interview	to	bring	up	that	subject.	It	would	either	consume	the	time	allotted	for	the	interview	or	it	could	upset	him	and	make	him	badly	disposed	towards	the	interview.	So,	my	real	challenge	was	to	be	able	to	put	those	thoughts	away	and	to	be	able	to	focus	only	on	what	he	was	telling	me	during	the	interview.		 In	the	end,	it	was	a	very	successful	interview.	I	managed	to	keep	the	focus	on	the	interview	and	he	was	very	generous	with	his	time	and	we	were	able	to	comfortably	cover	all	the	subjects.			 The	atmosphere	was	friendly	and	he	was	a	very	good	talker,	with	several	stories	and	anecdotes,	which	made	for	a	very	entertaining	interview.	I	was	surprised	by	the	kind	of	stories	he	was	willing	to	share	with	me,	although	he	asked	not	to	be	identified	for	some	of	them.	In	that	sense,	this	was	one	of	the	most	‘eye-opening’	interviews	that	I	had,	making	explicit	what	I	felt	was	the	most	Machiavellian	aspects	of	the	peacekeeping	settings	in	general,	and	of	MINUSTAH	in	particular.	His	point	of	view,	despite	having	been	SRSG	for	MINUSTAH	in	two	tenures,	was	more	aligned	with	his	then	current	position	in	the	UN.	That	meant	that	he	empathised	more	with	the	need	to	“consolidate”	MINUSTAH	(which	meant	ending	it	as	it	was)	in	order	to	move	on	and	have	new	peacekeeping	missions	in	other	places	of	the	world,	rather	than	with	giving	more	resources	to	or	prolonging	MINUSTAH.	
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		 This	paragraph	is	a	very	good	example	of	a	neoliberal	discourse	in	which	private	investment	is	at	the	core	of	every	economic	and	social	development.	Moreover,	the	economic	role	of	the	State	is,	on	the	one	hand,	to	provide	the	guarantee	for	investment.	On	the	other	hand,	the	role	of	the	State	also	consists	of	providing	opportunities	for	the	self-development	of	individuals.	And	it	is	the	sum	of	those	individuals’	development	which	becomes	the	development	of	the	country.		Of	course,	the	role	of	the	State	is	also	to	ensure	respect	for	human	rights,	and	the	rule	of	law	as	the	minimum	normative	framework	for	individuals	and	financial	interests.		 The	need	for	security	is	being	argued	(after	the	“because”)	as	something	required	for	investment45.	Moreover,	here	the	rule	of	law,	the	justice	system,	human	rights	and	state	organisation	are	included.	The	change	of	social	actors	from	“financial	interests”	to	“citizens”,	which	are	two	forms	of	collectivisation	(although	“financial	interests”	is	definitely	abstract)	is	also	a	change	in	their	agency.	On	the	one	hand,	the	“financial	interests”	are	presented	as	active	agents	whereas	the	citizens	even	though	beneficiaries	are	being	passivised.			 	Additionally,	this	kind	of	legitimation	fits	the	category	of	“rationalization”,	as	the	goals	of	the	institutionalized	social	action	that	the	law	enforcement	and	justice	institutions	are	meant	to	achieve	are	explained.	There	is	also	a	“rationalization”	legitimation	strategy	behind	the	goal	of	“socioeconomic	development”	which	could	be	achieved	if	security	is	provided	for	investors.	A	similar	argument	can	be	found	in	the	following	paragraph.			 	
                                            
45 This is also a very good example of Gramsci’s concept of hegemony: the interests of 
investors are presented as the interests of the whole. If we accept the idea that the financial 






D-SRSG:	[…]	I'm	totally	convinced	...	that	(2.5)	the	rule	of	law	(2.5)	stability,	is	inextricably	intertwined,	closely	linked	...	to	economic	development.	(2.5)	So,	having	a	police	force	that	enforces	the	law	...	with	all	due	regards	to	Human	Rights,	having	a	justice	system	...	that	holds	people	accountable	for	the	things	that	they	do,	whether	it's	criminal	acts,	civil	acts,	contractual,	labour;	a	justice	system	that	is	fair.		[…]	And	the	level	of	confidence	that	people	have	in	the	justice	system	(2.5)	provides	the	encouragement	(3)	for	investors,	whether	they	are	domestic	investors,	or	foreign	investors,	to	come	and	invest	money.	Domestic	and	international	investors	coming	to	invest	money	means	jobs.	Deputy	SRSG	Rule	of	Law,	2013	–	present	(in	2015)			 In	the	first	part	of	the	extract	the	D-SRSG	links	explicitly	the	“rule	of	law”	(which	is	his	expertise	in	MINUSTAH),	with	“stability”	and	“economic	development”.	He	elaborates	the	point	by	pointing	to	an	effective	and	fair	police	force	and	justice	system	as	necessary	ingredients	for	economic	development.	This	kind	of	legitimation	also	fits	the	category	of	“rationalization”,	in	a	very	similar	fashion	to	Extract	6.2.9.		 Again,	a	“rationalization”	legitimation	strategy	is	behind	the	goal	of	“economic	development”	and	the	creation	of	jobs.	Both	“economic	development”	and	“employment”	are	claimed	as	rational	goals	socially	recognised.		 		 The	argumentum	ad	populum	emerges	again	as	being	crucial.	This	time,	it	is	people's	confidence	in	the	justice	system	which	favours	investment.	At	the	same	time,	it	works	itself	as	a	metonym,	or	more	precisely	a	synecdoche,	of	the	part-for-whole	kind,	which	means	that	a	part	of	all	the	people	in	Haiti	(i.e.	investors)	are	taken	as	if	they	represented	everyone	in	Haiti.	It	seems	that	the	interviewee	is	referring	to	the	investors	as	the	people	who	should	have	that	confidence.	
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	 The	legitimation	of	investors	as	a	focus	on	what	needs	to	be	brought	about	in	Haiti	is	reinforced	by	the	claim	money	=	jobs.	 Even	though	here	is	not	the	appropriate	place	to	discuss	whether	all	investments	bring	jobs	or	how	many	jobs	a	given	investment	can	bring,	or	how	good	are	those	jobs,	suffice	to	say	that	the	identification	of	money	invested	with	jobs	shifts	the	goal	of	the	actor	from	the	financial	domain	towards	labour.	From	that	point	of	view,	the	implied	unemployment	works	as	form	of	argument	ad	misericordiam	where	you	cannot	oppose	private	investors	as	that	would	mean	opposing	people	getting	a	job.			 As	social	actors,	investors	are	represented	in	a	similar	fashion	to	Extract	6.2.9,	i.e.	as	active	actors	who	are	also	beneficiaries	of	the	conditions	that	would	encourage	them	to	invest.	The	Haitian	workers	that	would	benefit	from	the	jobs	created	by	these	investors	are	backgrounded	as	they	are	not	mentioned.			6.2.6	 Summary	and	Discussion	of	the	Interview	Analysis			 The	first	match	between	the	data	from	the	interviews	and	those	from	the	resolutions	analysis	has	to	do	with	the	intertwined	character	of	both	the	concepts	of	‘security’	and	‘stability’.	It	is	true	that	this	intertwined	character	was	presupposed	in	the	phrasing	of	the	question	asked	,	however	all	of	them	agreed	with	the	statement.	They	brought	what	comes	first,	and	even	though	most	of	the	extracts	point	to	‘security’	as	coming	before	‘stability’	it	is	also	possible	to	find	extracts	pointing	in	the	opposite	direction.		 Another	match,	which	is	closely	related	to	the	previous	one,	has	to	do	with	the	kinds	of	neighbouring	concepts	that	these	two	main	concepts	relate	to.	Similar	to	the	resolutions,	it	is	possible	to	find	these	concepts	related	to	development,	law	enforcement	and	the	rule	of	law.	These	neighbouring	concepts,	as	in	the	resolutions,	are	linked	with	the	rationalization	kind	of	legitimation.		 Additionally,	the	topos	of	urgency	also	appears	in	the	interviews,	although	in	a	metaphorical	expression.	Topoi	of	threat	are	also	used,	and	they	are	also	used	with	metaphorical	expressions.		 In	the	resolutions	analysis,	I	discussed	how	MINUSTAH	never	appears	as	the	sole	agent	responsible	for	achieving	security	and	stability	in	Haiti.	As	a	
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46 This it is not exactly the same wording as it appears in the resolutions, but due to its 





                                            




























































































7.5	 Summary	and	Discussion			 The	first	thing	that	can	be	said	about	the	analysis	of	these	extracts	is	that	it	is	possible	to	establish	counterpoints	between	the	different	interviewees.	There	are	critical	standpoints	and	‘official’	ones,	and	even	some	interviewees	that	could	be	critical	up	to	some	point	and	‘official’	in	others.		 These	critical	views	pointed	towards	how	MINUSTAH	had	reacted	to	these	shocks,	especially	both	the	earthquake	and	cholera	outbreak.	In	a	nutshell,	these	are	criticisms	of	the	shortcomings	and	the	limited	nature	of	the	approach	instead	of	one	that	could	be	more	long-term	and	sustainable.		 It	was	possible	to	identify	a	more	‘official’	UN	discourse	when	the	interviewees	showed	they	would	rather	not	discuss	the	responsibility	for	the	cholera	outbreak.	Moreover,	it	was	possible	to	find	arguments	pointing	towards	how	the	conditions	in	Haiti	and	its	lack	of	infrastructure	had	allowed	cholera	to	spread	fast,	rather	than	talking	about	how	a	disease	which	had	been	long	eradicated	from	the	country	suddenly	appeared	there.	These	were	the	arguments	that	the	UN	deployed	in	2011	as	soon	as	the	first	report	of	experts	was	published	(see	Sections	2.8.2	and	2.8.3	above).	Also,	when	talking	about	the	sexual	abuse	accusations,	it	was	possible	to	find	views	closer	to	those	found	in	the	resolutions	and	official	UN	communications,	i.e.	that	perpetrators	should	be	held	responsible	(“zero	tolerance	policy”)	and	that	these	are	not	acts	to	be	expected	in	a	peacekeeping	mission	(see	Section	2.8.3).	However,	it	was	also	possible	to	find	an	opposite	argument,	from	a	former	SRSG,	that	these	kinds	of	issues	are	likely	to	happen	in	these	settings.		The	issue	of	immunity	emerged,	either	explicitly	or	implicitly,	in	these	extracts.	Even	though	it	was	not	on	my	original	interview	schedule48,	it	was	
                                            
48 I had decided not to include it because I deemed it a controversial issue which goes beyond 
MINUSTAH, and therefore was likely to result in an abstract discussion instead of talking 
about the concrete issues in the context of MINUSTAH which referred to immunity such as the 






































                                            
49 I had decided not to include it explicitly because I deemed it a controversial issue which 
goes beyond MINUSTAH, and therefore was likely to bring an abstract discussion instead of 
talking about the concrete issues in the context of MINUSTAH, which also referred to 







8.2	 Contributions		 		 I	adhere	firmly	to	what	Billig	(2013)	deems	as	one	of	the	current	problems	in	academic	writing	in	the	social	sciences:	the	ongoing	creation	of	new	concepts	in	the	form	of	noun-based	technical	terms	(p.	10).	I	agree	with	him	that	this	makes	language	more	difficult	to	understand,	which	is	a	problem	per	se.	Additionally,	creating	new	concepts,	when	there	is	an	array	of	available	concepts	
                                            
50 Although these are not in the examples presented here. 
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51 I am fully aware that several of these missions are deployed when democratic institutions 
are broken or non-functional, and therefore it would be impossible to exercise democratic 
consent. However, several missions (including MINUSTAH) include in their mandate the 























































































































































































































































Project	title:		The	Discursive	Construction	of	the	UN	Mission	in	Haiti			1. I	have	read	and	had	explained	to	me	by	José	Manuel	Ferreiro	the	information	sheet	relating	to	this	project.		2. I	have	had	explained	to	me	the	purposes	of	the	project	and	what	will	be	required	of	me,	and	any	questions	have	been	answered	to	my	satisfaction.	I	agree	to	the	arrangements	described	in	the	information	sheet	in	so	far	as	they	relate	to	my	participation.		3. I	understand	that	my	participation	is	entirely	voluntary	and	that	I	have	the	right	to	withdraw	from	the	project	any	time,	but	no	longer	than	2	months	after	its	completion.	If	I	withdraw	after	this	period,	the	information	I	have	provided	will	be	used	for	the	project.		4. I	understand	that	all	data	collected	will	be	anonymised	and	that	my	identity	will	not	be	revealed	at	any	point.		5. I	have	received	a	copy	of	this	consent	form	and	of	the	accompanying	information	sheet.			Name:				Signed:			Date:		
